Nils wrote: ↑
Thu May 03, 2018 12:46 am
Kurieuo wrote: ↑
Wed May 02, 2018 4:25 pm
Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur
Nils wrote: ↑
Wed May 02, 2018 1:39 pm
Kurieuo, I will only comment the last part about free will. As I said several times elsewhere the argument for no free will that I discussed with Kenny is valid also if there is Ideal realism.
Clearly, a mechanical process where you flick over the first domino to have the last in the series fall over, the dominos in the series have no choice in whether they topple over or not. This is what the physical-material worldview entails. So then, if we are reducible to such a mechanical process, then any supposed expression of choice or action are merely dominos in the series falling over, which fall over because previous ones did.
So while it is rather easy to understand why there can be no free will if we live in a reality where matter is first ("matter is over mind"), it isn't clear why such can't be had if the fundamental nature of reality is actually mind first ("mind is over matter"). In fact, it seems to me that free will must be an immovable part of reality where mind is over matter. Merely asserting free will is impossible for all conceptions of reality, something I've also seen Sam Harris do, doesn't make it so.
I have hinted of some arguments.
The argument about “me” I gave in the thread There is no hope..” started:
“1. How I am now depends on how I was at some earlier time some moments ago and the environment between that earlier time and now (and on nothing else).”
This is valid even if you include a nonphysical mind in your world view. What else does how I am depend on?
1. Not true. This is a premise (not an argument) and can't possibly apply to Idealism, because it only deals with physical attributes to the exclusion of non-physical factors. Allow me to highlight for you:
- How I am now depends on how I was at some earlier time some moments ago and the environment [i.e., time and the environment—physical factors] (and on nothing else [which would include factors that transcend the physical])
So then, this boils down to a mere assertion that free will isn't possible on any view of reality (i.e., both Physicalism and Idealism). Ergo, quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur
—what is asserted without reason may be denied without reason.
Nils wrote:If I make a decision at a specific time I prefer to think that the decision is rational, that I consciously and/or unconsciously base it on my earlier experiences, thoughts, values, moral, feelings, etc. etc. In another world that is equal up to the time of decision I prefer to think that I will make the same decision. If not, why would I decide otherwise? If there is a random influence I may, but if you exclude randomness (that don’t add to free will) what force would determine a different decision.
Either the world is deterministic or there is randomness. In the first case there is no free will. In the second it has to be shown how sheer randomness adds to free will.
I agree that randomness doesn't provide free will. In determinism I generally include "randomness" within it, especially when discussing "free will". I think that perhaps randominity is simply a way many Materialists try to ease an otherwise a cold fatalistic view of a physical reality that can't logically support free will. Yet, while true randominity (even if logically can and really does exist) may avoid a strict form of determinism (fatalism), you are right that it still doesn't allow for free will.
I certainly have never argued randominity allows for free will or something vice-versa. To re-use my dominos example, if we flick the first domino over and each one keeps toppling over and eventually reaches a junction where it can go left or right. Let's say which path the dominos will go appears indeterminable to us (i.e., random). Nonetheless, whether it goes left or right isn't influenced by any "will", but rather mechanics that involve one event after the other which also happens to include randominity. It is a more complex mechanics, and if randominity is truly part of the physical order, then our choices and actions are nonetheless still determined via event causation (even if we may not be able to determine such).
"Will" on the other hand is purposeful and requires agency. Such that an agent wills to choose left or right, maybe even halts the dominos at the junction in order to diliberate upon whether to let the dominos start falling to the left or right. On the other hand a "will" that is determined by events exclusive from agency has no freedom to it and perhaps shouldn't really be called a will at all.
Nils wrote:Then there is the argument from luck and the argument from the impossibility of self-creation.
A-huh, Quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur.
Then there is the argument from our will, which everyone (yourself included) behaves in life as seriously possessing, and no doubt an argument from creativity that could be made.
Nils wrote:None of these arguments assume a materialistic world view. They are valid even if “mind is over matter”.
Again, quod gratis asseritur, gratis negatur
. You are in fact assuming a materialistic view (as I pointed out above), and even if they were valid arguments, I see nothing that holds up when we consider reality as being founded upon mind (e.g., as per Idealism).
Nils wrote:Which are your arguments?
Besides QM wherein our conscious decision to observe (mind) impacts upon a physical outcome (the material world), it are those who reject something so blatantly obvious like free will who need to give strong positive argument and evidence to the contrary.
Let me be quite blunt here. It is entirely stupid, I mean ABSOLUTELY STUPID... no, it is complete and utter intellectual foolery, to reject that humans possess a will -- that we possess a will -- that exterts a force over our thinking, beliefs, decisions and actions and ALL that stems out from free will.
What stems out from free will
includes our being ultimately
responsible and accountable for our actions. There really is some sense of justice to be be had in the world when a person who rapes a child, tortures them and eventually kills them after the course of their sick and sadistic actions end, is found guilty and punished. The question isn't whether justice should be had, but rather whether justice can ever fairly be measured out to make such a person pay for their
Furthermore, none of us behave like we aren't responsible for ourselves in our lived life. We're even insulted, deeply insulted, want to strongly defend when someone says our
beliefs are stupid. Like how I just called your
beliefs stupid, right? What's there to be insulted about. They're not yours, rather mere dominos falling in your head just like mine, well if such beliefs aren't influenced by a will of our own agency.
Final argument, is one of being consistent with who we are and how we live. It is practical for all intents and purposes to believe we have an influential will. To say we don't is to be inconsistent with yourself. I mean, if we don't possess free will and indeed such is logically impossible on all worldviews, then what is the point in debating us on anything Nils? That you do debate us, and even passionately so, and that you even appear to take pride in your position, evidences to me that deep down you don't really believe such nonsense.