If, in the end, DS is merely (and strongly) affirm that God is in fact one being then there is simply no objection from me, Mr. Morrison. However, there is a saying "The devil is in the details". Does DS affirm other things that are absurd or otherwise contradict what I believe is rational and real? But again, if all that DS simply says is that, then there is no argument from me. In fact, I would be gladly in your camp defending this piece of philosophy.since, in the end, simplicity merely (strongly)
affirms that the Trine God is in fact one Being.
Let me go ahead and tell you what I do endorse about God in addition to this. God is a perfect substance and that substance is not in any way analogous to anything else that exists. Now you may not like the term "substance" used in this manner, but thats what I believe is best to work with.
What I like in particular here, Mr. Morrison is that you openly admit that the Aristotelean/Thomism metaphysical framework has to be axiomatic in order for your arguments to have any force. Fair enough. Realistically, this is one aspect that I believe we should have a clear head on. You can't really say that your arguments have much force behind them until anyone concedes the metaphysical framework you endorse. If one simply doesn't agree with it, we're free to ignore it and be on our merry way and affirm any piece of Christian theology that still does work under another metaphysical framework (especially if its a rational improvement upon Aristotelean/Thomism. Surely you can agree with that, right?). Sure, you can say "Well, then its not classical theism", and sure I guess so but that doesn't matter at all. I don't see how getting a seal of "classical theism" makes you more right and/rational, so lets not push that angle. I think thats attempting to pull the wool over people's eyes inadvertently.It can scarcely escape notice that much of the
preceding discussion assumes an Aristotelian-Thomistic
metaphysical framework. The Prima Via explicitly assumes
Aristotle’s account of change, and much of the argument
between Plantinga and Aquinas has been shown to actually
boil down to an argument about the nature of universals
that is, in what sense to properties exist? Yet in much
of modern philosophy, Aristotle has gone by the wayside,
having supposedly been debunked by modern science. If,
then, Aristotle’s basic accounts are faulty, then it seems
that everything said above is at best misguided.
This is, of course, not the place to engage in a full
discussion on which metaphysical picture is correct. Yet
given the centrality of this question, it is worth noting
the possibility that Aristotle may have been cast aside too
quickly. In support of this notion, three brief arguments
are worth considering.
So, next you got
RE: UniversalsGeneral argument against Platonism
and let me go ahead and say that I don't endorse Platonism. Also, let me go ahead and get the definition for everyone here, so they can follow along.
Lets stop right there and let me go ahead and explain why I don't endorse this view and why I don't believe anyone else should.Platonism is the view that there exist abstract (that is, non-spatial, non-temporal) objects. Because abstract objects are wholly non-spatiotemporal, it follows that they are also entirely non-physical (they do not exist in the physical world and are not made of physical stuff) and non-mental (they are not minds or ideas in minds; the are not disembodied souls, or Gods, or anything else along these lines)
First of all, there is no adequate justification for asserting that universals are non-temporal. Second, charitably assuming that such universals are non-spatiotemporal. If that is the case, and in addition they are also non-mental. Then based on those 2 assertions, there is no way you can be informed of the existence of such things as universals. Hence, Platonism is rationally untenable. It matters not a single bit what Plato did in caves or any other experiments otherwise, these "universals" are undetectable to us and anything you would call a universal is simply hogwash (rationally speaking).
Now, I don't believe that Plantiga truly is fully committed to Platonism. I think he simply doesn't find Nominalism strong enough to hold his arguments up (probably). What it all mainly boils down to is the question of universals or abstract objects and its a complicated discussion so lets not get into it aside from me telling you that I am a rational realist (you should already know this)
You continue with this
I want to comment on the bolded to tell you that you are partially correct but gravely mistaken elsewhere. We're not at odds here. I don't think you have been given the proper lecture on rational realism and thus you haven't given it a fair shake. In fact, I agree with you on many things, Mr. Morrison. We believe in a lot of the same things, but that doesn't make it rational or right.General argument for realism of some sort
Since Descarte, philosophy has tended to take a
mechanistic view of the world—a view is fundamentally at
odds with the Aristotelian approach assumed throughout this
study. As such, many of the claims made in favor of
simplicity can easily be questioned or even dismissed given
modern metaphysical commitments. Brian Ellis calls this
You mention that Bruan Ellis calls this Passivism, and I'm guessing its because they don't feel the position is forceful enough (probably like Plantiga). This is the wrong way to view the philosophy since I consider it a very forceful position since it forces everyone to concede certain things about reality (like how little we know about it). What I like about it is that it intellectually "neuters" your opposition and forcefully require anyone to admit that they need a foundational explanation for their axioms. Now you may say that you and everyone else are basing your theories on "properly basic beliefs" but thats not going to cut it.
You continue with how there is dissatisfaction with "mechanistic" view and there are new arguments for the "new essentialism"
Now, let me go ahead and correct this. Descartes has never said there is no essence. His system directly supports that notion. On one hand, we have spatial extension (A rock for example) the essence of which is to take up space.In other words, things have
essences, and part of the essence of a thing includes its
natural potentialities (e.g., water has the potential to
exist as a liquid, solid, or gas)
So you go on to say
Now, modern science might be interested in how things do act, and uncovering and describing their basic natures. Sure, that is their interest, but that is no longer science. You would be absolutely correct in calling it modern science since such a system isn't based on rationality and consequently is intellectually bankrupt because of exactly that. The big difference between modern science and the scientific revolution is that the people who were doing the science method were also really well trained in philosophy (most of them were norminalists). Thats not the case these days and thats part of the reason why there is this abomination of verificationism/atheism today.Essentialism seems to have a strong case on its side.........That is, modern science
seems very interested not merely in describing how things
have acted, but how they do act—that is, in uncovering and
describing their basic natures.
Rational realism and modern science are not birds of the same feather, clearly.
You go on to say
Let me go ahead and tell you my view on forces. They aren't empirical. Sure, you can claim up and down that these "forces" do in fact exist because look at all the verified experiments, but thats phenomenalism. In the rational realist view, physics and math isn't science. Attempting to do such things without a proper understanding of what it is and why they exist is pretty much analogous to being a witch doctor.the passivist view
seems difficult to maintain in the face of modern science.....the causal powers of
certain things. The “forces of nature” in these models are
not broad, abstract frameworks, but rather descriptions of
the way really existing things really behave; that is, the
stuff of chemistry—atoms, molecules, electrons, and the
rest—are really thought to exist and really thought to have
the properties attributed to them. They are not passive
blobs of mass being pushed around by abstract forces.
Constant conjunction? Absolutely.
Necessary connection? Absolutely not.
I like to quote Hume on this view
So, Mr. Morrison, you may not like my approach on knowledge and God, but what I endorse is not at odds with you at all. When you say something proves or compelling evidence for the existence of God or the existence of forces. I believe you, but I believe you got it backwards (so, its actually wrong in that sense). We are the same thing, just a different tactic. I hope you get that at the very least. I tried to keep this brief to respect as much of your time as possible, so I apologize in advance if it doesn't satisfy your hunger like a snickers bar.Can it be proven by the relation of ideas? No. Can it be proven by matter of fact? No. Then commit it to the flames for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion