Craig's argument for God's temporality

[Jac3510]

I saw K mention Craig's argument again, and I wanted to point out what I think to be a fatal problem with it, namely, that it begs the question.

Once time begins at the moment of creation, either God becomes temporal in virtue of His relation to the temporal world or else He exists just as timelessly with creation as He does without it. If we choose the first alternative, then, once again, God is temporal. But what about the second alternative? Can God remain untouched by the world's temporality? It seems not. For at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before (since there was no "before"). Even if in creating the world God undergoes no intrinsic change, He at least undergoes an extrensic change. For at the moment of creation, God comes into the relation of sustaining the universe or, at the very least, of co-existing with the universe, relations in which He did not stand before. Since He is free to refrain from creation, God could never have stood in those relations, had He so willed. But in virtue of His creating a temporal world, God comes into a relation with that world the moment it springs into being. Thus, even if it is not the case tha tGod is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He nontheless undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real relation to the world.

Time and Eternity, 87

The italics above are Craig's own emphasis. Now let me requote it with my emphases in bold:

• Once time begins at the moment of creation, either God becomes temporal in virtue of His relation to the temporal world or else He exists just as timelessly with creation as He does without it. If we choose the first alternative, then, once again, God is temporal. But what about the second alternative? Can God remain untouched by the world's temporality? It seems not. For at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before (since there was no "before"). Even if in creating the world God undergoes no intrinsic change, He at least undergoes an extrensic change. For at the moment of creation, God comes into the relation of sustaining the universe or, at the very least, of co-existing with the universe, relations in which He did not stand before. Since He is free to refrain from creation, God could never have stood in those relations, had He so willed. But in virtue of His creating a temporal world, God comes into a relation with that world the moment it springs into being. Thus, even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He nontheless undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real relation to the world.

The parts in bold are temporal references. That is, they presuppose the temporality of God in order to prove that God is temporal. This is a standard case of begging the question, for he is assuming the very thing he is trying to prove! Indeed, Craig never even interacts with the very argument he is seeking to refute, which is that God exists timelessly with His creation. If this is the case, then there is no "moment of creation", nor a "before" or "prior" to creation; there is no "refraining" from creating (for if God had decided in His eternally changeless state, He could not decide anything else), and to simply assert that God underwent change is to assert the very thing we are debating! Above all, there can be no "new relation," because that, again, assumes the issue under discussion. A timeless God has no "new relation," and yet this entire concept is key to Craig's refutation of the argument. Finally, to say God is drawn into anything implies a change in position--a position He at one time had, and a later time did not, or put differently, at one time did not have, but at a later time had. But yet all this is the very thing that those who advocate timelessness reject!

In short, Craig assumes God is temporal in order to prove that God is temporal. This, of course, is not to say that Craig is necessarily wrong, but only that his logic is wrong in this particular case.

[Canuckster1127]

Seems a pretty clear case of attributing to God the limitations of His creation. While God could choose to limit himself voluntarily a la Phill 2:5-11 as demonstrated by Christ, that was a matter of becoming Human not interacting with humanity. Who's to say God can't exist in both elements or planes at the same time? This could almost smack of pantheism in some regards.

[Kurieuo]

I saw K mention Craig's argument again, and I wanted to point out what I think to be a fatal problem with it, namely, that it begs the question.

Once time begins at the moment of creation, either God becomes temporal in virtue of His relation to the temporal world or else He exists just as timelessly with creation as He does without it. If we choose the first alternative, then, once again, God is temporal. But what about the second alternative? Can God remain untouched by the world's temporality? It seems not. For at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before (since there was no "before"). Even if in creating the world God undergoes no intrinsic change, He at least undergoes an extrensic change. For at the moment of creation, God comes into the relation of sustaining the universe or, at the very least, of co-existing with the universe, relations in which He did not stand before. Since He is free to refrain from creation, God could never have stood in those relations, had He so willed. But in virtue of His creating a temporal world, God comes into a relation with that world the moment it springs into being. Thus, even if it is not the case tha tGod is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He nontheless undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real relation to the world.

Time and Eternity, 87

The italics above are Craig's own emphasis. Now let me requote it with my emphases in bold:

• Once time begins at the moment of creation, either God becomes temporal in virtue of His relation to the temporal world or else He exists just as timelessly with creation as He does without it. If we choose the first alternative, then, once again, God is temporal. But what about the second alternative? Can God remain untouched by the world's temporality? It seems not. For at the first moment of time, God stands in a new relation in which He did not stand before (since there was no "before"). Even if in creating the world God undergoes no intrinsic change, He at least undergoes an extrensic change. For at the moment of creation, God comes into the relation of sustaining the universe or, at the very least, of co-existing with the universe, relations in which He did not stand before. Since He is free to refrain from creation, God could never have stood in those relations, had He so willed. But in virtue of His creating a temporal world, God comes into a relation with that world the moment it springs into being. Thus, even if it is not the case that God is temporal prior to His creation of the world, He nontheless undergoes an extrinsic change at the moment of creation which draws Him into time in virtue of His real relation to the world.

The parts in bold are temporal references. That is, they presuppose the temporality of God in order to prove that God is temporal. This is a standard case of begging the question, for he is assuming the very thing he is trying to prove! Indeed, Craig never even interacts with the very argument he is seeking to refute, which is that God exists timelessly with His creation. If this is the case, then there is no "moment of creation", nor a "before" or "prior" to creation; there is no "refraining" from creating (for if God had decided in His eternally changeless state, He could not decide anything else), and to simply assert that God underwent change is to assert the very thing we are debating! Above all, there can be no "new relation," because that, again, assumes the issue under discussion. A timeless God has no "new relation," and yet this entire concept is key to Craig's refutation of the argument. Finally, to say God is drawn into anything implies a change in position--a position He at one time had, and a later time did not, or put differently, at one time did not have, but at a later time had. But yet all this is the very thing that those who advocate timelessness reject!

In short, Craig assumes God is temporal in order to prove that God is temporal. This, of course, is not to say that Craig is necessarily wrong, but only that his logic is wrong in this particular case.

We had a long discussion about this on the old board. Quite frankly, I sincerely doubted then as I do now whether you fully grasp the foundations Craig lays out in reasoning, particularly the discussions surrounding dynamic and static concepts of times.

Craig does not limit God's nature to timelessness, nor does he limit God's nature to temporality. Rather for Craig, as is evident in his reasoning his intrinsic/extrinsic reasoning you quote, God's nature transcends both. That is, states of timelessness and time have no impact upon God's nature.

To the person who can follow Craig's reasoning, one can gain an insightful and powerful argument for God's existence. An air-tight argument whereby only a timeless sentient being with a will and power such as God is logically able to transcend a timeless unchanging state and choose to enter into temporality via the creation of our universe.

To those reading, they might be wondering what the point to all this is? There is an embarrassing dilemma for the Christian who says that our world must have a cause due to the impossibility of an infinite regression, since obviously this means God Himself needs a cause since God is also a part of the series. Hence the often secular retort of "Who made God?" to the Christian who says the universe had to have been caused by something. Craig's reasoning on God's relationship to time is the only consistent way out of this dilemma as I see it. Merely stating "God is timeless" is not enough since such just begs the question around a 'magical' undefined term without further exploration about what such a concept even means. If this is the limit of our response as Christians, then the secular philosopher appears logically justified to conclude based upon Okham's razor that it is more reasonable to simply assume our universe is the "First Cause" - the uncaused causer.

[Jac3510]

I expected a quick rely from you, K

Let's not get into insults by talking about what the other does and does not "fully grasp." Further, I'm not even saying Craig is wrong about God's being temporal. I am saying his argument--and only this particular one; in his book, he offers several others--is a logically unsound argument in that it begs the question. Whether or not God is temporal, Craig's argument here is invalid because he assumes a temporal God in order to prove a temporal God.

As for this:

There is an embarrassing dilemma for the Christian who says that our world must have a cause due to the impossibility of an infinite regression, since obviously this means God Himself needs a cause since God is also a part of the series.

You are making the same mistake Dawkins makes when here derides Christians for appealing to Kalam's argument, for he said that Christians abritrarily make the "first cause" terminate with "God." But whether or not he is right about this, both he, and Craig, and you now, seem to be making the same fundamental mistake. When Aquinas said that the world could not exist as an infinite regress, he was not talking about an event regression of past events. In fact, he explicitly says that such an infinite regress may or may not be possible--he just didn't know. He used the illustration of a Grandfather->Father->Grandson->Greatgrandson, etc.

Against this, Thomas argued that the Hand-Stick-Rock regression is impossible, and we DO have to make that distinction. The idea is that a hand holds a stick which is used to push a rock. Here, the rock is causally moved by the stick which is causally moved by the hand. If the hand is taken out of the equation, the rock cannot move. This is not the case with the regression of events, for if the grandfather is taken out of the equation (perhaps he dies), then the father can still have a son. Thomas said that an infinite regress of causes is impossible, and therefore there must be a terminal cause. But this has nothing to do with temporality, and therefore, your "embarrassing dilemma" is no dilemma at all.

[Kurieuo]

I expected a quick rely from you, K

Of course, I am always interested in philosophical issues of a theological nature.

Let's not get into insults by talking about what the other does and does not "fully grasp."

I did not mean it as an insult, but it is what I felt coming away from our previous discussions. A lot of what was said on that old board many years ago I felt involved me laying a lot of foundations in order to try continue our discussion, particularly with what each concept of time meant.

If I remember correctly, you took to CS Lewis' idea of a movie real where God has the prerogative to go back and forward infinitely at will. Thus, what is happening today is just as real 'now' as what happened yesterday = static theory of time. However, if I also remember correctly, you embraced many parts of what I said about a dynamic theory of time. For example, I think you rejected the idea that Christ is permanently hung on the cross for all eternity, which is required from a static conception of time. Thus, I was left with an impression that you were quite confused about what you did believe, and were merely reacting to gut intuitions and knee-jerk reactions to keywords, rather than having a well thought out position gained through an examination philosophical issues.

Further, I'm not even saying Craig is wrong about God's being temporal. I am saying his argument--and only this particular one; in his book, he offers several others--is a logically unsound argument in that it begs the question.

Do you have Craig's book? His analysis of God's relationship to time is built upon his laying out the case for a dynamic conception of time being true. In the book you refer to, only about 10 or so pages (of 200 or something) are dedicated to summarising what this means for the Christian conception of God and how it resolves some issues (such as why the first causer needs no cause).

Whether or not God is temporal, Craig's argument here is invalid because he assumes a temporal God in order to prove a temporal God.

I believe you are confusing the 'ontology of God's nature' with an understanding of God's relationship to us and the world we live in. Craig does not argue God's nature is temporal, and neither does he argue that God's nature is timeless. God is neither temporal or timeless. These terms only have bearing where God's extrinsic relationship is concerned.

For example, your nature is not changed if a car passes you while you wait on the side of the road. There was a state where in relation to the car, the car had not passed you. And then there was a state where in relation to the car, the car had passed you. Yet, your own ontological nature did not change because of your extrinsic relationship to the car. And as such, neither does God's own ontological nature change because of his extrinsic relationship to us and the world He created.

As for this:

There is an embarrassing dilemma for the Christian who says that our world must have a cause due to the impossibility of an infinite regression, since obviously this means God Himself needs a cause since God is also a part of the series.

You are making the same mistake Dawkins makes when here derides Christians for appealing to Kalam's argument, for he said that Christians abritrarily make the "first cause" terminate with "God." But whether or not he is right about this, both he, and Craig, and you now, seem to be making the same fundamental mistake. When Aquinas said that the world could not exist as an infinite regress, he was not talking about an event regression of past events. In fact, he explicitly says that such an infinite regress may or may not be possible--he just didn't know. He used the illustration of a Grandfather->Father->Grandson->Greatgrandson, etc.

Against this, Thomas argued that the Hand-Stick-Rock regression is impossible, and we DO have to make that distinction. The idea is that a hand holds a stick which is used to push a rock. Here, the rock is causally moved by the stick which is causally moved by the hand. If the hand is taken out of the equation, the rock cannot move. This is not the case with the regression of events, for if the grandfather is taken out of the equation (perhaps he dies), then the father can still have a son. Thomas said that an infinite regress of causes is impossible, and therefore there must be a terminal cause. But this has nothing to do with temporality, and therefore, your "embarrassing dilemma" is no dilemma at all.

Aquinas offered several lines of argument and Aquinus did in fact have 'first cause' arguments. Certainly in no way as evolved as today's, but then Aquinus did lay several foundational arguments which have evolved under the scrutiny of Modernity and "the Enlightenment."

Your interpretation of Aquinus does nothing the explain why God needs no cause. Just because you terminate at "Grandfather" does not mean this is as far back as the genealogy goes. Thus, without further explanation, Dawkins is quite right along with every Atheist, to claim the Christian arbitrarily draws the line at God. And the dilemma remains until one deals with God's relationship to causality (time).

[Jac3510]

I did not mean it as an insult, but it is what I felt coming away from our previous discussions. A lot of what was said on that old board many years ago I felt involved me laying a lot of foundations in order to try continue our discussion, particularly with what each concept of time meant.

If I remember correctly, you took to CS Lewis' idea of a movie real where God has the prerogative to go back and forward infinitely at will. Thus, what is happening today is just as real 'now' as what happened yesterday = static theory of time. However, if I also remember correctly, you embraced many parts of what I said about a dynamic theory of time. For example, I think you rejected the idea that Christ is permanently hung on the cross for all eternity, which is required from a static conception of time. Thus, I was left with an impression that you were quite confused about what you did believe, and were merely reacting to gut intuitions and knee-jerk reactions to keywords, rather than having a well thought out position gained through an examination philosophical issues.

Well, first off, I don't see God as "going" back and forward in time. I see time, for God, as an Everpresent Now. And I recall that I agreed that, in a sense (that is, from God's perspective), then Christ is hanging on the cross eternally (which is to be distinguished from "everlastingly" or "forever").

Do you have Craig's book? His analysis of God's relationship to time is built upon his laying out the case for a dynamic conception of time being true. In the book you refer to, only about 10 or so pages (of 200 or something) are dedicated to summarising what this means for the Christian conception of God and how it resolves some issues (such as why the first causer needs no cause).

Yes, I have it right here in front of me. I simply pointed to this particular argument because it is one of his major arguments, and it is the one I have seen you, and others, allude to.

I believe you are confusing the 'ontology of God's nature' with an understanding of God's relationship to us and the world we live in. Craig does not argue God's nature is temporal, and neither does he argue that God's nature is timeless. God is neither temporal or timeless. These terms only have bearing where God's extrinsic relationship is concerned.

For example, your nature is not changed if a car passes you while you wait on the side of the road. There was a state where in relation to the car, the car had not passed you. And then there was a state where in relation to the car, the car had passed you. Yet, your own ontological nature did not change because of your extrinsic relationship to the car. And as such, neither does God's own ontological nature change because of his extrinsic relationship to us and the world He created.

Not at all. First of all, I don't know how much I like Craig's distinction between God's intrinsic and extrinsic "natures" in the first place (the word "nature" doesn't even apply there!); he seems to get that by rejecting the doctrine of simplicity, which I fully accept. His arguments against it, especially with reference to the Trinity, are, in my opinion, are not convincing.

Second, regardless of "nature," I am saying that it is Craig, not me, who has misused God's ontology. The temporalness or timelessness of God is an ontological issue. So are issues of "nature." If, though, you try to separare nature and temporalness, saying the latter is ontological while the former is not, then you can't get anywhere with Craig's argument in the first place, as you would be mixing categories. Very well, so we are dealing with ontology (as expected). In this case, the entire concept of God existing "before" the world or being brought into a "new" relationship presupposes temporality, which is the very issue being discussed. Thus, regardless of whether or not God IS temporal, Craig's argument to that, so far as it is framed here, is fallacious as it begs the question.

Aquinas offered several lines of argument and Aquinus did in fact have 'first cause' arguments. Certainly in no way as evolved as today's, but then Aquinus did lay several foundational arguments which have evolved under the scrutiny of Modernity and "the Enlightenment."

Your interpretation of Aquinus does nothing the explain why God needs no cause. Just because you terminate at "Grandfather" does not mean this is as far back as the genealogy goes. Thus, without further explanation, Dawkins is quite right along with every Atheist, to claim the Christian arbitrarily draws the line at God. And the dilemma remains until one deals with God's relationship to causality (time).

One of us has misunderstood the other. I'm not dealing with an interpretation of Acquinas . . . I'm dealing with his actual argument. Here, see Two Notions of the Infinite in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologica I, Questions 2 and 46. I am saying that Kalam is simply misguided and incorrect. Dawkins, Craig, and you are all working from Kalam's position of an infinite regress of EVENTS. I am dealing with an infinite regress of CAUSES, which are different things entirely. When you make this distinction, there is no dilemma at all; in fact, I could (and later will) make the case that it the dilemma ONLY reappears when you assert that God is temporal.

God bless

[Kurieuo]

I did not mean it as an insult, but it is what I felt coming away from our previous discussions. A lot of what was said on that old board many years ago I felt involved me laying a lot of foundations in order to try continue our discussion, particularly with what each concept of time meant.

If I remember correctly, you took to CS Lewis' idea of a movie real where God has the prerogative to go back and forward infinitely at will. Thus, what is happening today is just as real 'now' as what happened yesterday = static theory of time. However, if I also remember correctly, you embraced many parts of what I said about a dynamic theory of time. For example, I think you rejected the idea that Christ is permanently hung on the cross for all eternity, which is required from a static conception of time. Thus, I was left with an impression that you were quite confused about what you did believe, and were merely reacting to gut intuitions and knee-jerk reactions to keywords, rather than having a well thought out position gained through an examination philosophical issues.

Well, first off, I don't see God as "going" back and forward in time. I see time, for God, as an Everpresent Now. And I recall that I agreed that, in a sense (that is, from God's perspective), then Christ is hanging on the cross eternally (which is to be distinguished from "everlastingly" or "forever").

If for God everything that was and ever will be is an everpresent "now", then how can God move along side us in our present point in time?

Furthermore, to say there is a state of Christ eternally hanging on the cross, and then a state where this no longer applies (since it is not an everlasting reality), is in fact to cause a temporal change since the very nature of temporality is one state preceding another.

Do you have Craig's book? His analysis of God's relationship to time is built upon his laying out the case for a dynamic conception of time being true. In the book you refer to, only about 10 or so pages (of 200 or something) are dedicated to summarising what this means for the Christian conception of God and how it resolves some issues (such as why the first causer needs no cause).

Yes, I have it right here in front of me. I simply pointed to this particular argument because it is one of his major arguments, and it is the one I have seen you, and others, allude to.

Great! Have you read it from the beginning and following his reasoning weighing up the A and B theories of time? Which did you find yourself agreeing with in the end?

I believe you are confusing the 'ontology of God's nature' with an understanding of God's relationship to us and the world we live in. Craig does not argue God's nature is temporal, and neither does he argue that God's nature is timeless. God is neither temporal or timeless. These terms only have bearing where God's extrinsic relationship is concerned.

For example, your nature is not changed if a car passes you while you wait on the side of the road. There was a state where in relation to the car, the car had not passed you. And then there was a state where in relation to the car, the car had passed you. Yet, your own ontological nature did not change because of your extrinsic relationship to the car. And as such, neither does God's own ontological nature change because of his extrinsic relationship to us and the world He created.

Not at all. First of all, I don't know how much I like Craig's distinction between God's intrinsic and extrinsic "natures" in the first place (the word "nature" doesn't even apply there!);

Nature involves substance. A relationship involves how one substance stands in relation to another. Thus, it makes no sense to talk of God's 'extrinsic nature'. In the way Craig and I would use extrinsic, this is like say God's nature external to His nature which is just nonsense. When extrinsic is used, it is used to mean external to God's nature. When intrinsic is used, it is intended to mean God's very nature (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc).

he seems to get that by rejecting the doctrine of simplicity, which I fully accept. His arguments against it, especially with reference to the Trinity, are, in my opinion, are not convincing.

I can confirm for you Craig's position on simplicity if you like from a book I have where he touches on this (I am not currently at home, so will need to check this when back home). However, I am fairly certain that in this particular case what it seems to you is not actually the case.

Second, regardless of "nature," I am saying that it is Craig, not me, who has misused God's ontology. The temporalness or timelessness of God is an ontological issue.

How so?

If, though, you try to separare nature and temporalness, saying the latter is ontological while the former is not,

The nature of something is ontological. Ontology is about studying the nature of existence or being. An extrinsic relationship to time in no way affects one's ontological nature (what constitutes their being). I would be interested to read how it does?

In this case, the entire concept of God existing "before" the world or being brought into a "new" relationship presupposes temporality,

Yes, Craig in fact offers up a line of argument similar to yours against those who try to argue that God can not be timeless before the creation of the world, because this implies there is a time God existed before time making God temporal. However, it is wrongheaded to look backwards after time's existence to then assume that time's coming into existence could retro-cause time to exist before itself. To do this one needs to presuppose/assume the perspective of temporality (as you point out). You and Craig are here actually in agreement!

in fact, I could (and later will) make the case that it the dilemma ONLY reappears when you assert that God is temporal.

I agree that if God is temporal then a dilemma appears. If God is timeless then one needs to devote their attention as to how God can be timeless while entering into time with His creation of our world. This is all Craig has done.

[Jac3510]

If for God everything that was and ever will be is an everpresent "now", then how can God move along side us in our present point in time?

In the strictest sense, He doesn't. Anthropomorphically He does, but by that measure, He also changes His mind, has wings, and doesn't know the past, future, or even present. So if we are limiting our discussion to philosophy, particularly metaphysics, then I'll say that God does not "move along side us in our present point in time."

Furthermore, to say there is a state of Christ eternally hanging on the cross, and then a state where this no longer applies (since it is not an everlasting reality), is in fact to cause a temporal change since the very nature of temporality is one state preceding another.

It is important to make a distinction between an eternal perspective and a temporal perspective. God, experiencing time as an Everpresent Now, has an eternal perspective. That, however, is a different thing from something being everlasting, because if something is everlasting then it is temporal, for everlasting means it will continue on and on and on. But continuing presupposes moment by moment transitions, which is, by definition, temporal. Thus, the eternal cannot, philosophically speaking, be said to be "everlasting."

Thus, from God's eternal (timeless) perspective, Christ is eternally hanging on the Cross, just as I am eternally being born, just as Satan is eternally being cast into the Lake of Fire, just as the world is eternally being created, and just as the Millennial Kingdom is eternally being established (remember, time is an Everpresent Now). From a temporal perspective, though, Christ's death, my birth, Satan's condemnation, the Creation, and the establishment of Christ's Kingdom are one time events with a past, present, and future.

Great! Have you read it from the beginning and following his reasoning weighing up the A and B theories of time? Which did you find yourself agreeing with in the end?

How about you just ask me about which parts I agree and disagree with. I'd rather not do a book review and page by page point out where I agree and disagree.

Nature involves substance. A relationship involves how one substance stands in relation to another. Thus, it makes no sense to talk of God's 'extrinsic nature'. In the way Craig and I would use extrinsic, this is like say God's nature external to His nature which is just nonsense. When extrinsic is used, it is used to mean external to God's nature. When intrinsic is used, it is intended to mean God's very nature (e.g., omniscience, omnipotence, omnibenevolence, etc).

You are using "substance" more loosely than I would. I don't know that I would agree that nature involves substance. I know that personhood doesn't, and I'd be inclined to say that nature doesn't either.

Now, essence is a substance. Being is a substance. We have to decide if we are using "nature" to refer to a "thing" or to refer to the collective whole. I mean that this way: a person is not a thing; a human being is a thing. The person I am is certainly separate from the body (that is, the human being) that I "inhabit" (but please don't read too much into that word! I'm not a dualist in the least). After all, if I am dead and you stand beside my casket, you aren't going to look at my body and say, "There is Chris." You are going to say, "There is Chris' body."

Ok, so if "things" are "substance," and a person is a not a "thing," then we have to decide which category "nature" falls into. Is "nature" a thing or a non-thing? But regardless, which is what I go on to say, I don't like any of this discussion anyway, because it violates the doctrine of simplicity. God cannot have two natures and still be said to be simple so long as you view nature as a substance. But if you don't view nature as a substance, then I'm not sure how Craig's argument works in the first place.

I can confirm for you Craig's position on simplicity if you like from a book I have where he touches on this (I am not currently at home, so will need to check this when back home). However, I am fairly certain that in this particular case what it seems to you is not actually the case.

Do quote. The section I read (which I can't look at again right now, because I left the book at work) had him saying that it was a medieval doctrine that had been dropped by modern theologians because it couldn't be reconciled to the Trinity.

How so?

The nature of something is ontological. Ontology is about studying the nature of existence or being. An extrinsic relationship to time in no way affects one's ontological nature (what constitutes their being). I would be interested to read how it does?

I agree the nature of something is ontological. That is why I said, "temporalness or timelessness of God is an ontological issue. So are issues of "nature." If, though, you try to separare nature and temporalness, saying the latter is ontological while the former is not, then you can't get anywhere with Craig's argument in the first place, as you would be mixing categories. Very well, so we are dealing with ontology (as expected)."

But this is precisely where Craig starts mixing categories. Look at your own words: "An extrinsic relationship to time in no way affects one's ontological nature." This is correct! Therefore, since God's "extrinsic relationship" to the universe does not effect His ontology, then Craig cannot say that this extrinsic relationship draws God into temporality. That is, if God's ontology is that He is timeless, then His relationship with the world, which does not affect His ontology, cannot be said to change His ontology so as to render Him temporal. But that is exactly what Craig tries to do. He is, then, mixing categories. He is using extrinsic natures in an ontological sense. But if he is using it that way, then ontologically speaking, God was already temporal. And if God was already temporal, then the argument is circular, because Craig assumes the very thing he is trying to prove.

Yes, Craig in fact offers up a line of argument similar to yours against those who try to argue that God can not be timeless before the creation of the world, because this implies there is a time God existed before time making God temporal. However, it is wrongheaded to look backwards after time's existence to then assume that time's coming into existence could retro-cause time to exist before itself. To do this one needs to presuppose/assume the perspective of temporality (as you point out). You and Craig are here actually in agreement!

Which is the irony, as I see it, of Craig's point, and I think one that is fatal to his argument. It is precisely because we cannot retro-cause God to be temporal "before" the creation of the universe (if there were such a thing) that we cannot appeal to a temporal God to prove a temporal God. But if that is the case, then we cannot say that God was "drawn into a new relationship." Look again at all the words I bolded in the OP. All of that falls flat on its face in recognition of Craig's point here. Thus, we are left with one of two possibilities:

1. God is temporal, and thus needs a cause;
2. God is timeless (eternal).

I agree that if God is temporal then a dilemma appears. If God is timeless then one needs to devote their attention as to how God can be timeless while entering into time with His creation of our world. This is all Craig has done.

I don't see any problems with a timeless (that is, eternal) God. The key is to maintain the doctrine of simplicity.

[Kurieuo]

Thus, we are left with one of two possibilities:

1. God is temporal, and thus needs a cause;
2. God is timeless (eternal).

I feel you are trying to pin one of two options on Craig. A third option, the one Craig actually advocates in his book, is God is timeless but chose out of His desire to have real relations with us, to create our world thereby entering into temporality. It is quite simple and resolves many difficulties I think are here being glanced over and ignored.

Perhaps you wish to limit God to a timeless eternity whereby God can not choose to enter into our temporal world, and if that is the case, then there are a complex range of problems. One being how was it possible for God to create our temporal world without entering into it at time zero. To say the act of creation is an eternal act causes a wide range of other issues. If everything that has ever happened in our temporal universe is as eternal as God is, such diminishes eternality as being a defining characteristic only God possesses.

Furthermore, if God is unable to enter into our temporal world, God can not have a real personal relationship with each of us. God can not live through time with us. Since in your own words God is "experiencing time as an Everpresent Now" God can not know what we are going to do tomorrow, nor does he know what we did yesterday. This is a direct attack on God's omniscience. If God can not know what "now" is for us, then God has no reference point to judge what tomorrow or yesterday is for us. He has no tensed knowledge whatsoever!

Craig delves into a great deal of these problems in his book to arrive at the conclusions he does. When I first read his book it actually almost bored me to tears, so I can understand if you have not had the time or patience to read it. Not until the end did I realise the importance of all the foundations he laid, and begin understanding the importance of it all.

[Jac3510]

K, all you've done here is to offer a series of reductio ad absurdums that may or may not even follow from the premise that God is timeless. Even if I grant all of them are true (which I don''t), that doesn't get us away from the fact that Craig's argument is logically invalid. Whether or not God is temporal, Craig's position, as quoted above, is simply illogical. He is begging the question by presupposing a temporal God to prove a temporal God.

Now, regarding your actual words:

A third option, the one Craig actually advocates in his book, is God is timeless but chose out of His desire to have real relations with us, to create our world thereby entering into temporality. It is quite simple and resolves many difficulties I think are here being glanced over and ignored.

This ignores the issues I've already pointed out, which is that you are forcing an ontological change on God. The moment we agree that "nature" is an ontological issue, then extrinsic changes also ontological changes. Craig's entire position, then, is rooted in the notion that God's intrinsic nature is immutable, whereas His extrinsic nature is mutable. I simply reject that as a rejection of the doctrine of immutability, just as I reject open theism since it rejects omniscience. I also reject that because it rejects the doctrine of simplicity. In fact, I don't even know that we should be talking about intrinsic vs. extrinsic natures in the first place. So while I agree that it solves one difficulty, it does so by changing God. We have, in effect, two different Gods we are talking about. It is like the conversation we had with kingreaper on the old board. He argued:

1. An all loving, all powerful, all knowing God would not allow suffering to exist.
2. Suffering exists.
3. Therefore, an all loving, all powerful, all knowing God does not exist.

To this, I simply congradulated him on proving his premise. That is, he proved a god exists that we don't even believe exists in the first place (due to his definition of "all loving). In effect, he and I had different gods. I can't accept a position that rejects God's simplicity or immutability. That is, I can't accept a position that does not assume classical theism.

And regarding your absurdums:

Perhaps you wish to limit God to a timeless eternity whereby God can not choose to enter into our temporal world, and if that is the case, then there are a complex range of problems. One being how was it possible for God to create our temporal world without entering into it at time zero.

I'm not limiting God to anything. That's your word, not mine. Second, I did not say that God cannot "choose to enter into our temporal world." I seem to recall that He did in the Incarnation. Further, every miracle, the Creation, the Consummation, every time God spoke or speaks, everything is in the confines of the temporal world. It is up to you to show that a timeless God cannot act in a temporal context.

1. God is timeless,
2. ?
3. Therefore, God cannot act in the temporal world.

To say the act of creation is an eternal act causes a wide range of other issues. If everything that has ever happened in our temporal universe is as eternal as God is, such diminishes eternality as being a defining characteristic only God possesses.

First, I'll commit my own logical fallacy by saying that you have the same problem (tu quoque), for in your own view, Creation (and every temporal act of God) is eternal, too. So if this knocks out my view, it knocks out yours as well. So much for the absurdity.

You are not dealing with my argument that this is a matter of perspective. Things are eternal from God's perspective; they are not eternal in and of themselves. In fact, more technically, the thing itself is not eternal; God's perception of it is eternal. It is a contradiction to terms to insist that a thing is both temporal and eternal. Ontologically, the Crucifixion is temporal. We cannot say, then, that it is ontologically also eternal. What we can say is that God's epistemological relationship to the Crucifixion is eternal, but epistemology does not modify ontology. That is the exact same error the open theists make when they argue that God's knowing our future destroys free will. In philosophical terms, it is called a modal error. So this objection does not hold up.

Furthermore, if God is unable to enter into our temporal world, God can not have a real personal relationship with each of us. God can not live through time with us.

Put logically:

1. God is timeless;
2. Timelessness and temporality are opposites;
3. Therefore, God cannot enter the temporal world to live with us.

The problem here is that (3) just does not follow from (1) and (2). The actual conclusion would be, "Therefore, God cannot be tempoal," which is just trivially true. But it does not necessarily follow that a God who is not temporal cannot act in a temporal world. That's just an assertion. I disagree with it.

Since in your own words God is "experiencing time as an Everpresent Now" God can not know what we are going to do tomorrow, nor does he know what we did yesterday. This is a direct attack on God's omniscience. If God can not know what "now" is for us, then God has no reference point to judge what tomorrow or yesterday is for us. He has no tensed knowledge whatsoever!

No, it is a direct attack on Middle Knowledge, which I reject anyway. To the contrary, I hold this view in part because it does uphold, indeed explain, God's omniscience. I would agree that God has no tensed knowledge (from the eternal perspective) because there is no tensed anything for an Eternal Being.

Anyway, the answer to your problem lies in the idea that God is the First Cause of everything. That is, He is NOT reactionary. I, on the other hand, am reactionary. I react to God, always. God does not react to me, ever. Therefore, God has perfect knowledge, not simply of what I am doing, but what I would do should He Himself choose to act differently, because I am reacting to Him, not vice versa.

SO - all that said, you've posed no problems that don't have traditional answers, and your position imposes those that cannot be answers, so it seems to me. Further, it requires us to change the very nature of God by altering or denying His central attributes. And all this is based on a fallicious, circular argument. Sorry, I'm not impressed with Craig''s work n this particular area.

[Kurieuo]

Reading over your post I see more of a rhetorical game being played, with broad sweeping statements and attributions which do not actually apply to either Craig or myself and are quite false.

I am going to break off this discussion as I am not interested to play a winning game, neither am I interested in defending Craig's position, which I have only done here as I largely agree with it. To be fair, you would really need to take your complaints with Craig's position up with Craig himself (if that were at all possible). Unless someone reading wishes to learn further about the position I hold regarding what has been discussed, and I do consider myself in agreement with Craig's, then I would be happy to provide further information.

To provide some examples from your previous post in particular of what I mean regarding rhetorical games and false attributions:

K, all you've done here is to offer a series of reductio ad absurdums that may or may not even follow from the premise that God is timeless. Even if I grant all of them are true (which I don''t), that doesn't get us away from the fact that Craig's argument is logically invalid.

This has no actual content, but rather consists of broad sweeping statements intended to persuade you are right.

Whether or not God is temporal, Craig's position, as quoted above, is simply illogical. He is begging the question by presupposing a temporal God to prove a temporal God.

As I have here repeated, Craig does not believe God is temporal in an ontological sense of His very being. This is either a false attribution or misunderstanding you have with Craig's position. Rather God is able to act temporally, and in this way God is temporal; however nothing has changed intrinsic to God's own nature from when He existed timelessly before creation. You might disagree, but this gives you no right to continue attributing ideas that are not held.

The moment we agree that "nature" is an ontological issue, then extrinsic changes also ontological changes. Craig's entire position, then, is rooted in the notion that God's intrinsic nature is immutable, whereas His extrinsic nature is mutable.

As previously pointed out saying "God's extrinsic nature" is like saying "God's nature external to His nature". Such is plain nonsense talk and shows a misunderstanding of terminology on your part.

Perhaps you wish to limit God to a timeless eternity whereby God can not choose to enter into our temporal world, and if that is the case, then there are a complex range of problems. One being how was it possible for God to create our temporal world without entering into it at time zero.

I'm not limiting God to anything. That's your word, not mine.

Ok, I'll take you on your word on this despite your beliefs that God can not enter into temporality due to His atemporal (timeless) nature, and thus God would be unable to know tensed facts or have a relationship with us in the present.

Second, I did not say that God cannot "choose to enter into our temporal world." I seem to recall that He did in the Incarnation.

And despite God experiencing temporality in our world, God is "experiencing time as an Everpresent Now"? Seems to me there is a glaring logical inconsistency to your position that God is timeless, while at the same time experiencing temporality and able to understand tensed facts.

It can not be logically said, "God is timeless, but God experiences temporalness." Both ways can not be logically had at the same time.

First, I'll commit my own logical fallacy by saying that you have the same problem (tu quoque), for in your own view, Creation (and every temporal act of God) is eternal, too. So if this knocks out my view, it knocks out yours as well. So much for the absurdity.

No it is not. Every temporal event is not eternal at all. This is a static conception of time, and I reject that position.

This statement is really what dismayed me in this discussion. If up until now such a big mistake or misunderstanding can be made with the position I advocate, then I see little worth continuing as I can only imagine what other misunderstandings you have regarding what I (or Craig) believe in. No wonder our position makes no sense to you whatsoever.

In any case, I will leave it here. I pray you are not offended, but I really see no profit in continuing for many of the reasons above.

God bless.

[Jac3510]

I pray you are not offended

Why should I be? You didn't deal with any of my objections, told me I didnt know what I was talking about, took my entire argument and wrote it off as "broad sweeping statements," ignored the specifics, and took the supposed "high road" even as you proceeded to characterize my position as rhetorical and full of false attributions. And you did all this without defending anything at all, but only offering more assertions.

Basically, your reply was one long ad hominem. Offended? Nah. Not even a little bit. I'm just glad for the productive discussion. What's more fulfilling than having your objections taken seriously?

[Kurieuo]

I pray you are not offended

Why should I be? You didn't deal with any of my objections, told me I didnt know what I was talking about, took my entire argument and wrote it off as "broad sweeping statements," ignored the specifics, and took the supposed "high road" even as you proceeded to characterize my position as rhetorical and full of false attributions. And you did all this without defending anything at all, but only offering more assertions.

Basically, your reply was one long ad hominem. Offended? Nah. Not even a little bit. I'm just glad for the productive discussion. What's more fulfilling than having your objections taken seriously?

I just think a proper understanding needs to take place of the position you are attacking before you should be arguing against it. Crucial statements made lead me to conclude this is far from the case. These do not seem to be small misunderstandings, but rather major conceptual lacunas. I may be wrong, but I can't help how I see it. So I am not sure how, or what I am suppose to do, to continue serious dialogue unless I were to simply offer it up responses in a non-serious manner. I want to give you the courtesy of not doing this. Anything I say would really be half-hearted since I do not really believe you understand the position you are attempting to tackle.

I am for attacking positions that believe God is temporal such as Gregory Boyd's (if you have read anything of his), but Craig's is far from the same. I see that despite some reactions and differences on terminology used, from what you say, your understanding could be very likely similar to Craig's at the end of the day. It is just not coming across that way.

Again, my apologies, but I do not know what else to do.

[Kurieuo]

I can confirm for you Craig's position on simplicity if you like from a book I have where he touches on this (I am not currently at home, so will need to check this when back home). However, I am fairly certain that in this particular case what it seems to you is not actually the case.

Do quote. The section I read (which I can't look at again right now, because I left the book at work) had him saying that it was a medieval doctrine that had been dropped by modern theologians because it couldn't be reconciled to the Trinity.

Simplicity
I have tracked down the Craig's doctrine of simplicity pages, however just incase of copyright issues, I will not post the pages here publicly. Please see the PM I will send you though.

To give a rundown, you are correct insomuch as Craig rejects a neo-Platonic understanding of simplicity as an ultimate metaphysical reality, where God being such a reality, is an undifferentiated unity. In other words, this means there is no complexity in God's nature or being. Rather any divine attribute is derived from, or simplified into, one. From memory, this is how I understood the doctrine of simplicity in my philosophy of religion class, and this is how Craig describes it in his book on philosophy (Philosophical Foundations for a Christian Worldview - refer to my PM).

Aquinas himself apparently argued for the existence of such a simple being by means of his cosmological argument. While Craig rejects this, since it entails God having no distinct properties within Himself (e.g., omnipotence is not the same property as goodness), Craig still sees merit to the doctrine of simplicity albeit not a full-blown doctrine of simplicity.

Immutability
Further to the above, it seems I may have myself misunderstood Craig's own beliefs regarding God's immutability. It is not only an extrinsic change Craig believes happens with God (as I commented in my previous posts), but also an intrinsic change. This means Craig beliefs God Himself is affected. This changes your argument from what I considered to be nonsense (that an extrinsic change is still intrinsic to God's nature), to more simply an intrinsic change being advocated outright.

To explain this intrinsic change... If God is able to experience temporality in our world, then more changes than simply his relationship to time (which is purely extrinsic). I did not see this conclusion before, however if God experiences temporality, then as time flows God's knowledge of tensed facts changes. What happens tomorrow for us today, is different from what happens tomorrow if we were a month from now. Thus, God's knowledge of yesterday, the present, and tomorrow (tensed facts) continually changes as time flows forward. As such, God's knowledge of tensed facts is not immutable. Yet, the double-edged sword is, if God does not know what "now" is for us, then God is not omniscient. So instead of embracing a radical and strong sense of God's immutability, Craig embraces a relaxed sense (and I'm inclined to believe more Biblical sense - which is what counts!) that God is immutable when it comes to His 1) character (e.g., goodness), 2) existence (e.g., necessity, eternity, aseity) and 3) being (e.g., omnipresent, omniscience and omnipotence).

Anyway, I have attempted to summarise here Craig's words for readers, as well as yourself. Please see my PM first though before responding.

[Jac3510]

I guess I should eat a little crow here; I reread your reply that I took such exception to, and while I still think it was a bit unfair of you to simply reject my entire position out of hand by labeling it an argument from ignorance (more or less), I pretty clearly read a more abrasive tone in it than was intended. I expect you to know me better than to argue on a position about which I'm clueless; likewise, I should know you better than to assume such a harsh reply. On that, my apologies.

Beyond that, we've kind of gone off into two different directions here. My original point was that Craig's argument, as quoted above, is circular. I wasn't really commenting on whether or not God is temporal; I was simply pointing out that this particular phrasing of the argument is unsound. I don't have to understand his position (though I think I do) to be able to spot a fallacious argument. Of course, it being circular doens't mean the position is wrong, as we all know:

1. The Bible is God's Word; or
1'. The Bible is infallible;
2. The Bible says God exists;
3. Therefore, God exists.

Clearly circular, but we all agree the conclusion is true. Please don't misunderstand me. I am not saying that Craig believed that God was temporal prior to the creation; to the contrary, I know that is not his position. He takes it that a timeless God chose to enter into temporality by virtue of creation. But his argument, as quoted above, assumes a temporal God to prove the temporal God (that, or it retrocauses God to be temporal). Any way you slice it, Craig has God existing in two distinct stages:

1. Pre-Creation ("timeless")
2. Post-Creation (temporal)

When Craig talks about (2), he refers repeatedly to (1) in such terms as entering into a "new" relationship, and the way He existed "before", etc. But any being, including God, that exists pre- and post-anything can in no sense be said to be timeless. I don't know if he would agree or disagree; he certainly asserts that God was (or might have been) timeless before creation and then temporal after creation, but that is my whole point. To assert that God was timless at one point presupposes a change in points, which is the essence of temporality! Thus, whatever label Craig wishes to use for "Phase 1" of God's existence, when viewed in totality, that phase points to a temporal God. Indeed, does it not follow that any being with phases is, by its very nature, temporal? So I say that Craig's argument is cicular, because in the sense described here, he presupposes a temporal God to prove God is now temporal.

Now, it seems to me that it is logically impossible for a timeless being to "become" temporal, because the definition of timeless disallows it to "become" anything, because that would require that being to have potentiality. Well, if you have potentialilty, then it implies that you are not something yet that you may yet be; but when would you be such a thing? Notice the word "when"! That is a temporal word, for the entire concept of potentiality is, by its very definition, temporal. Thus, a timeless being cannot have potentiality; and in that case, a timeless being cannot have the potential to become temporal. Thus, either God always has been temporal or He is timeless.

For the record, I actually don't have the problem with a temporal God in the same sense that I used to. I don't know that Kalam's argument works; who is to say that an infinite regression God in "God's time" doesn't exist, thus rendering God temporal? I am not saying I believe that He can exist temporally in the infinite past. I'm saying I have to reconsider my arguments on that, because now I don't know. But I do believe that God is simple (in the classical sense of the word) and immutible (in the classical sense of the word), and for that reason, I reject the notion.

Anyway, I'm not too sure how to take your most recent reply. I'm glad that you looked up Craig's statements on these two issues; I'm not sure where you stand on them. Perhaps we should open a separate thread (or just continue it here, if you like) to discuss whether or not God is simple/immutible, and what that would mean. So we can have either discussion (or both).

1. Is Craig's argument, as presented above, circular?
2. Is God simple/immutible, and if so, in what sense?

Edited for clarity