Hi NSV,
So I think we are in substantial agreement. I don't want this post to run long, so let me just say in response to your last reply to me that I agree with you that we need to show that the principle cause (hereafter, PC) has intentionality if it is to be worthy of the name "God." I also note that you are correct that I lapsed into unnecessary language with the personal pronouns. That was sloppy on my part, so thanks for the correction. It's important not to sneak ideas in that have not been demonstrated. Other than that, let's hold off for a minute on the timeless void issue. I think the way I want to go about this will answer that question.
Okay, so we actually need several arguments to get to intentionality, and I don't want this to go on for years. So rather than going premise by premise, I'm going to go through several arguments at a time, hopefully with the same degree of precision we've been using already. The first thing we need to do is unpack two major implications of the claim that the PC is timeless/non-temporal/eternal and unchanging/immutable.
On Immateriality
- 1. That which cannot change is indivisible (for if a thing can be divided, it can be changed);
2. The PC cannot change;
3. Therefore, the PC is indivisible;
4. All material things--that is, all physical bodies--are divisible;
5. Therefore, the PC is not a material thing, which is to say, the PC is immaterial.
On Pure Existence
- 1. Any thing's property not identical with that thing's essence is either caused by its essence or comes from outside of the thing in question.
2. An essence cannot produce its own existence or it would be prior to itself.
3. Therefore, if something's existence is not identical with its essence, it must come from outside of the thing;
4. To have any property come from outside one's essence is to be effected;
5. The PC cannot be effected (since to be effected is to be changed, and the PC cannot be changed);
6. Therefore, the PC cannot have any property come to it from outside of itself;
7. Therefore, the PC's existence is neither produced by its essence (see 2) or comes to it from outside of itself (see 3-5);
8. Therefore, the PC's existence is identical with its essence; that is, the PC is Existence Itself
If these premises can be sustained, then they show that in addition to the PC being eternal, immutable, and powerful (in the sense that it has the power to effect changes), we have now seen that it also is immaterial and is, in fact, Existence Itself. In fact, this last property is especially important. We will make a lot of it in our remaining discussion. Because the moment we affirm that the PC is Existence Itself, we can see that it is intuitively obvious that the PC is also eternal, immutable, powerful, and immaterial. I won't lay out those arguments here, but I trust that you'll be able to see that pretty easily. The reason, though, we had to go this way is because you can't just assert Existence Itself is a real concept. We had to show it.
Of course, as always, I need you to ask questions, offer objections, or confirm what we've seen so far. Since I just did in one post what I would have done in thirteen in our previous procedure, I would be shocked if you didn't have some questions or concerns at this point. But perhaps you agree, so let me stop and give you the chance to comment on this so far. I would only ask that we focus on the validity of the logic itself or of the validity of any individual premise. It is very, very easy at this point to turn our attention to uncomfortable implications of all this. In fact, wrote my master's thesis on this subject, and I can assure you that pretty much everyone--even among the most brilliant evangelical scholars--goes that route. It's disappointing, because while the
reductio ad absurdem is a fair argument, it still remains afterwards to show where the logic itself fails, otherwise, the
reductio turns out not to show the absurd at all but instead show some counterintuitive idea is true!
I think if we can show these two ideas, intentionality will be fairly easy to establish (as easy as anything in this subject is). Your thoughts?
edit:
Bonus argument on immateriality:
- 1. All material things stand some sort of real relations to one another (e.g., bigger than, smaller than, in spatial proximity to, etc.);
2. At least some material things are experiencing temporal change;
3. If the PC is material, then it stands in a real relation to those material things that are experiencing temporal change;
4. Therefore, if the PC is material, then its relationship with those material things that are experiencing temporal changes is constantly changing;
5. Therefore, if the PC is material, it is constantly changing;
6. But the PC cannot change;
7. Therefore, the PC is not material
Beyond this argument, I also tend to think that Einstein has shown that
all material things must be temporal insofar as material things are necessarily a part of the space-time continuum. That is, time seems to be a constituent part of matter, so where there is matter, there is necessarily time, and where there is time, there is necessarily change; so it seems to follow
again (I suppose this is a third argument for the PCs immateriality) that the PC cannot be material, since the PC is atemporal.
