Where do you guys stand?

[DivineRageFromSpace]

No, cuz

and children and sterile persons have in common that they're both unable to sexually reproduce

this is beyond the argument, this is introducing something in the argument which the statement is not even aimed at. There is a big difference. There are tons of non-common things between children and adults and I can very well attack your statement and say that since you are excluding those factors thus your statement is inadequate to address the issue. You can't have it both ways, rage.

There are indeed uncommon things between the two factors that would make them incomparable in most other arguments; but I was only addressing the one portion of his argument, which was without any statement that would qualify it to only apply to children and as such was incomplete and inaccurate. After all, if the statement "Sex is for reproduction" doesn't apply equally to all parties who who can't reproduce that engage in sex, then neither is it valid for any party who can't reproduce that engages in sex.

[neo-x]

There is indeed a difference. For one, sex can be used for many things, fun, torture(rape), fetish (BDSM), love, but in all of this the designed function of sex remains the same, and that Jac pointed out correctly, is to reproduce. You can use the baseball bat to drive a nail in the wood, or hit someone in the head or smash a car, doesn't really change what use you put to it, but it is clear what the function of bat is, that is in the game itself to hit the ball.

What I pointed out was simple. On one hand you are arguing that having sexual fantasies about children are harmful or not, Jac clarified that it is just not the act but what triggered the act is where we can establish if it is morally wrong or right. That it went beyond the our desires and inclinations. With your last post you took the wrong turn and pulled the act in question "is it immoral to have sex with sterile person" when the act was never in question but what drives the act. Jac was not addressing the act to begin with. He cleared this out.

In other words this wastes time.

I might very well ask you, "Have you stopped beating your child, yet?". You can see why this is not a valid question.

[DivineRageFromSpace]

There is indeed a difference. For one, sex can be used for many things, fun, torture(rape), fetish (BDSM), love, but in all of this the designed function of sex remains the same, and that Jac pointed out correctly, is to reproduce. You can use the baseball bat to drive a nail in the wood, or hit someone in the head or smash a car, doesn't really change what use you put to it, but it is clear what the function of bat is, that is in the game itself to hit the ball.

What I pointed out was simple. On one hand you are arguing that having sexual fantasies about children are harmful or not, Jac clarified that it is just not the act but what triggered the act is where we can establish if it is morally wrong or right. That it went beyond the our desires and inclinations. With your last post you took the wrong turn and pulled the act in question "is it immoral to have sex with sterile person" when the act was never in question but what drives the act. Jac was not addressing the act to begin with. He cleared this out.

I'm well aware that he was addressing what drives the act, but what he said should drive the act was reproduction. I offered the "sterile person" argument as a counter example to that drive. But, yes, the argument has started to go off course a little bit . . .

[Jac3510]

Well put, Dan, but you haven't yet refuted my example: You've only refuted the principle behind my example. Even assuming that the principle is no longer true, the argument I put forth still stands up to the arguments you've put forth so far. You've said "Moral is the natural order of things and is intrinsic", whereas I've said that "A system tends toward disorder and the population's view on homosexuality evidences this in society". You said that I misused the Second Law of Thermodynamics by attributing it to something besides Thermodynamics (and attributing it to something that is intrinsic rather than exrinsic, might I add), and this is admittedly true, but that is only the first part of the argument. You said that morals are defined by the most widely accepted view on something, and I provided an example where something became widely accepted over time. Therefore, according to "the natural order" argument, it went from being immoral to being moral, regardless of whether or not the Second Law of Thermodynamics can be used to qualify morality.

TL;DR: Good point. Now respond to the question.

Look at the part I underlined. I said no such thing. You've misunderstood me. Morals are most definitely NOT defined as the most widely accepted view of something. I explicitly denied that when I said the moral order is an objective, intrinsic part of nature and therefore exists independently of the mind. I said the moral order is played out in society, and that just in virtue of what morality is. That doesn't mean that society determines morality. It just means that where there is no society, there is no such thing as morality (sort of like if there is no universe, there is such thing as physics).

Thank you, this is very insightful. However, you contradicted the point you made earlier, that "The moral order is the recognition of that nature as played out in a society of people". Here you said that "Society can change its mind about what is moral. That, however, doesn't determine the morality of something". So which is it? Does the society of people have to recognize the moral order for it to be moral or does morality as we're speaking of it now exist regardless of whether society recognizes it or not? If it's the latter, we're back to the beginning of the argument.

And if society can change it's mind about what is moral or not, then who's to say that they're right about it being immoral to involve a child sexually, or even fantasize about it?

Again, you misunderstood me. Society can change its mind about what is moral. That doesn't mean that society decides what is moral or not. Suppose I am taking a math test. I mark a particular answer. Later, upon thinking about it, I change my mind and then change the answer. Does my new answer change whether or not the sum really is what it is? No. It only changes whether or not I am right about that sum.

The bottom line, again, is that your argument fails because you are appealing to nature in the sense of "mother nature," that which is observed by physical science. I, however, am appealing to nature in the sense of a thing's essence--what a thing really is in and of itself. When you hear people say, "That's just human nature," they're using the word more closely to the way I am.

-----------------------------------------

I will stop you right here because you get into a mess of what is unethical versus what is, what I think you are trying to say, unhealthy. But what is unhealthy doesn't strike me as necessarily immoral. People eat junk food and I don't see this as wrong-doing - Maybe I'd prefer them not to and maybe I wouldn't partake in such activities myself, but I won't tell them they can't. Now, I'm not a consequential, I do think certain virtues are applicable.. but I don't see this act as immoral or a-virtuous, but possibly even preventative with respect to actual moral harm. I understand that your moral system is a great deal stricter than mine (mine allows for a wide range of freedom), but I don't see this as a shortcoming.

I'd also like to say that I disagree - evil things are evil because they hurt others, and I see no such exception. As such, I'd disagree with your premise...

No, I'm not trying to say that unethical = unhealthy. The relationship between those two is the same as the relationship between evil and harm. What is evil is usually harmful; being harmful is not what makes it evil. Likewise, what is evil is usually unhealthy; being unhealthy is not what makes it evil. Beyond that, if you assert that things are evil because they harm others, then you are a consequentialist. That's the definition of consequentialism. You can be a consequentialist, of course, but that's just where we disagree. I started my comments by saying that this is why consequentialism is an insufficient view of ethics. It allows things that are clearly unethical (e.g., sexual fantasies about children) as being ethical. You say you're being logically consistent. I agree. You are. I just see your consistency as a reductio ad absurdem proving the untenability of your position.

I think what may be wrong for one person may be okay for another - that isn't to say I think morals are entirely relative, but I do think there are context-dependent scenarios. And I'd think many people would agree - killing can be justified when it's in self-defense, eating junk food can be okay if it's in moderation and you exercise after, and partaking in fantasies can be fine if you're responsible about it and do not become obsessed.

Morality is usually context specific, and that in virtue of what it is. It is not unethical for me to sleep with my wife. It would be very unethical for you to sleep with my wife. Some things are absolutely wrong--unjustified killing. Some things are only wrong in excess (e.g., eating too much junk food). Some things are actually good in moderation (e.g., exercise) and become bad in excess (e.g., too much exercise is bad for the body--you need rest). Aretaic ethics, which is the formal name of the position I'm espousing, has no problem with any of that.

Your appeal to an order of how things ought to be is striking - just because a thing tends to be bad does not make it bad in all situations, does it? I don't particularly like this set of rules with little flexibility, it seems to deny the actual complex nature of events. There are many different aspects to every decision that each have merit and each have negative aspects as well, blanket statements about what one ought to do require context to be appropriately examined. Further, how is it that you claim to know, with certainty, what is moral and maximally optimal for humans (this seems to be an entire conversation in of itself approaching)? And why can't it vary from person to person - there are many differences and sometimes what is maximally optimal is not necessarily optimal (what is success without struggle? Should all hardship and suffering be eliminated? Yadda yadda). This is why I think ethical systems that allow for wide range of freedoms tend to be more successful, especially among varied populations.

Your confusion here stems from your equation of "the good" with "the healthy." Indeed, we can't be 100% certain what is healthy for us. We have really good guesses, but we can't KNOW. We can have scientific certainty, but as you well know, scientific certainty is necessarily probabalistic. None of that applies to ethics, because it is based on an analysis of nature (that is, of essence).

Pause. Two things are coming to mind immediately here. One, it sounds as if you're about to commit a naturalistic fallacy, and two, you seem to have missed a lot of the point of sex e.g. social aspects such as in bonobos, or more specifically in humans, the strong social and emotional bonding that can come with sex and intimacy. Sex is a complex and deep psychological and biological phenomenon and it should not be surprising that it serves multiple purposes. It sounds like you might disagree on this point, however, and I'm also willing to discuss that. But, the second point seems largely irrelevant here.

Wrong. The naturalistic fallacy appeals to nature in the sense of mother nature. I'm appealing to nature in the sense of intrinsic order. I'm speaking as an Aristotelian, not a Lockean. See my previous comments on this.

I'll start with noting that it isn't morally relevant whether or not a child can reproduce (sometimes girls hit puberty as young as 9), but whether or not it is healthy for them to engage in sex; clearly it isn't and causes demonstrable and lifelong harm in many cases. This is undesirable, clearly. But, you lose me entirely with the invocation of thought crime as disorder. It doesn't seem to follow that desire and fantasy about immoral acts is necessarily immoral.

I am particularly stuck on this line: "Now the desire for disorder is itself disordered, since such desire necessarily reduces happiness in the long run (and most definitely does nothing to maximize it!)"

It seems you lack justification for this. There are plenty of things we might desire to do, but abstain from - and no observable harm is done. In fact, it doesn't seem to be that harm would even be a probable (or in some cases, possible) result. In fact, if certain fantasy or hypothetical scenarios help you relieve tension (punching a bag with an ex-boyfriend's face on it to relieve stress, writing an angry letter and then throwing it away). I think we must take into account psychological facts and well-being when we are considering what is maximally optimal with concerns to a human's well being, yes?

Again, your appeal to health misses the point. Something being unhealthy may be a diagnostic indicator that it is therefore immoral, but the two are not to be equated. If they are, you're just back to consequentialism again.

The reason you can't see the justification for the assertion that the desire for disorder is itself disordered is that you have not understood what I mean by 'order.' You still have in your mind the physical order of mother nature. I've said repeatedly I am talking about intrinsic order. I'm appealing to the nature or essence of things; not to a description of how thing behave in nature. The former is an actual constituent of a thing; the latter is a pattern deduced by the human intellect and imposed upon that thing, and is therefore not an actual constituent of a thing. Put differently, the former deals with ontology; the latter with epistemology.

So to restate, my foundational premise here is that things have natures, and that natures determine to what a thing is intrinsically ordered. That includes humans, and therefore, humans are intrinsically ordered to certain things. When multiple humans get together in a construct we call society, a complex arises in which humans interact and those actions impact one another. Now, that is by nature--that is to say, humans are intrinsically ordered to interact with one another. That entails that certain actions are properly ordered and some are disordered. Murder is disordered, for instance, because it violates the natural order intrinsic to the human soul and therefore intrinsic to the society of people. When humans act in accordance with their intrinsic natures, happiness is maximized. When they don't, happiness is retarded or even diminished. That is to say, disordered acts are wrong. Now the desire for disorder is itself disordered, for even desires are to be properly ordered. That is to say that to desire disorder is wrong. For all of these reasons, it is evident that sexually fantasizing about children is simply wrong.

It doesn't follow from this, of course, that "mental pedophiles" should be locked up. That gets into an entirely different debate over the nature and role of government. Just because something is wrong, it does not necessarily follow that it is within the jurisdiction of government to punish it. I shouldn't lie to my wife, but the government has no right to fine me if I do (unless that lie is with respect to a public institution--e.g., lying in a contract, which places it in their jurisdiction). I, then, would object to your use of the term "thought crime" as the word "crime" has connotations that are inappropriate for this discussion. Intentionally or not, such commentary poisons the well.

I say that this intuition is wrong and leads to morally wrong behavior. We should shun no one, especially when they seek help. Many pedophiles wish they did not have the desires they do and want help to contain their desires. It is clearly and absolutely better for a pedophile to be allowed some sort of fantastic escape than to act on such fantasies.

Further, I challenge your notion that their desires are not "natural". I have read the accounts of pedophiles who struggle with their desires and wish they did not have them - why would they choose this? There is also scientific studies to back this up (I will supply them on request). It is lamentable that they have these desires which must not be fulfilled, but to shun them without compassion does not seem moral and certainly does not seem Christ-like. It is their struggle and I think we should help them in whatever way we can so as to protect them from the temptation of fulfilling these desires.

Bottom line: fantasizing about children is dreadfully evil, and that whether it is accompanied by masturbation or not!

[/quote]
What makes you think that choosing something makes it natural? I never said that pedophiles choose their fantasies. Indeed, that's another reason to view it is a disorder. When people have these kinds of problems, they do need help, and a responsible society helps them. In that case, it is rather like someone born blind. They, through no fault of their own, are unable to function in accordance with their proper nature. They're eye isn't doing what it is naturally ordered to do. Does that mean that there is nothing wrong with them? Of course not! It means just the opposite: because their eye is not doing what it is supposed to do, we have a problem, and we act to help them resolve it where we can. Just so with moral disorders. Things go wrong, and people's moral organs (so to speak) can be broken and not function correctly. We should help them where we can and where they desire it.

This is one of the reasons that they argument "homosexuals are born that way!" doesn't impress me. Even if they are, they doesn't change the fact that their desires are intrinsically disordered. Being born a particular way and with a particular desire doesn't justify any given action. The question is whether or not that action is in keeping with the natural law. Any action that intentionally deviates from that law is wrong.

[Beanybag]

No, I'm not trying to say that unethical = unhealthy. The relationship between those two is the same as the relationship between evil and harm. What is evil is usually harmful; being harmful is not what makes it evil. Likewise, what is evil is usually unhealthy; being unhealthy is not what makes it evil. Beyond that, if you assert that things are evil because they harm others, then you are a consequentialist. That's the definition of consequentialism. You can be a consequentialist, of course, but that's just where we disagree. I started my comments by saying that this is why consequentialism is an insufficient view of ethics. It allows things that are clearly unethical (e.g., sexual fantasies about children) as being ethical. You say you're being logically consistent. I agree. You are. I just see your consistency as a reductio ad absurdem proving the untenability of your position.

I practice a form of virtue ethics which is to say - I think some actions that don't cause harm can be unethical based on the virtues of the decision of the actor. But I do consider consequences very much and I think any good moral system should. However, I've never been convinced that any type of fantasy, especially when it is in the realm of fiction, is bad. Take the anime example - sometimes the young children in those shows aren't actually young, but hundreds of years old and mature, they only have a child's body. When you're in the realm of fiction, many different things are possible.

This is one of the reasons that they argument "homosexuals are born that way!" doesn't impress me. Even if they are, they doesn't change the fact that their desires are intrinsically disordered. Being born a particular way and with a particular desire doesn't justify any given action. The question is whether or not that action is in keeping with the natural law. Any action that intentionally deviates from that law is wrong.

I agree, it doesn't impress me either, but it's because I think nothing is wrong with the act even if they freely chose their orientation. I also don't agree that it's intrinsically disordered. As a social species, sex plays a very specific role which is rarely procreation. This is not a disordered purpose, but one that we can see was clearly intended by our biology. It has overlap. And I think, even under your own system, your appeal to an intrinsic order can allow for homosexuality - you simply need to acknowledge that there is more than one purpose to sex, even in principle, biologically, or according to this order. It's a complex biological process with effects all over your body - these effects are not incidental, but intended. I would like to know how you know what the true order or essence of things is, also.

[Jac3510]

I practice a form of virtue ethics which is to say - I think some actions that don't cause harm can be unethical based on the virtues of the decision of the actor. But I do consider consequences very much and I think any good moral system should. However, I've never been convinced that any type of fantasy, especially when it is in the realm of fiction, is bad. Take the anime example - sometimes the young children in those shows aren't actually young, but hundreds of years old and mature, they only have a child's body. When you're in the realm of fiction, many different things are possible.

Some virtue ethicists hold, as you do, that it is the virtue (or lack thereof) that renders an act ethical or not. I do not hold to that view. I see the virtues as tools that help us do the good, which is why I prefer the term aretaic ethics over virtue ethics. If you have access to a good university system, try to get a copy of Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas' Ethics (you can see my review of the product there as well). The point is that the reason we develop the virtues is so that we can practice the good at any given moment; the more virtuous we are, the more we can do the good. The less virtuous, the less we can. To take a simple example, courage is a virtue. A brave man is more likely to do good in terrifying situations than a coward, and so we do well to become more courageous. But doing something courageously is not, in and of itself, what makes something good. Put simply again, the virtues enable us to do or recognize the good, and that is why we seek them--not for their own sake, but so that having obtained them we can practice the good more consistently.

All this says that a truly virtuous person does not have disordered fantasies. Children and the weak minded--those who have no self-control--do. The key issue here is really not so much what is the bad. The real question is, what is the good? While I take 'good' to be a primary idea that cannot be strictly defined (it is, indeed, a transcendental and ultimately interchangeable with terms such as 'true' and 'being'), in general it is that which perfects a man's being (which means it must maximize that to which he is intrinsically ordered). In Christian ethics, that means that there are many proximate goods (e.g., eating when I am hungry, but in moderation) and one ultimate good (the beatific vision, for God is the ultimate end (telos) of man). Applied to the question of fantasy, this means that desire for that which is contrary to human nature (as sexual relations with children certainly is) is to desire that which is intrinsically disordered. To desire that which is intrinsically disordered is therefore itself intrinsically disordered, since it is not to desire the good (as the good, by definition, cannot be intrinsically disordered). So if the desire for disorder is itself disordered, and sexual relations with children is disordered, then the desire for sexual relations with children is disordered. Thus, fantasies in that regard are disordered and therefore wrong.

I agree, it doesn't impress me either, but it's because I think nothing is wrong with the act even if they freely chose their orientation. I also don't agree that it's intrinsically disordered. As a social species, sex plays a very specific role which is rarely procreation. This is not a disordered purpose, but one that we can see was clearly intended by our biology. It has overlap. And I think, even under your own system, your appeal to an intrinsic order can allow for homosexuality - you simply need to acknowledge that there is more than one purpose to sex, even in principle, biologically, or according to this order. It's a complex biological process with effects all over your body - these effects are not incidental, but intended. I would like to know how you know what the true order or essence of things is, also.

It's absurd to say that homosexual relations are "clearly intended by our biology." The penis is designed (by God or evolution, I don't care in this case) for the vagina; the male for the female, and that for procreation. That's the intrinsic order of the sexual organs. People can and do have sex for reasons other than procreation (my wife and I do). Natural law does not require that every sexual act be an attempt at procreation. It does, however, require that every sexual act be such that it is consistent with the intrinsic ordering of act. My wife and I, for instance, do not practice sodomy. Even in marriage, it is intrinsically disordered.

Again, sex has many benefits. And I agree that it even has several purposes (teloi). But all that says is that sex has a certain intrinsic order about it that encompasses certain aspects. What that means is that I am not free to have sex in a way that violates that ordering--and that with anyone, my wife or anyone else. For instance, one of the purposes of sex (in humans) is to express love. That's part of its intrinsic ordering. Therefore, it would be wrong of me to engage in the marital act with my wife while fantasizing about another woman, because them I am not really expressing love for her (rather, I am wishing I was expressing love to another). Or again, it would be wrong to rape my wife. You would say it is wrong because it violates her body and is non-consensual, which is true. But things can be wrong for more than one reason. Another reason it is wrong is that rape uses sex strictly as a means of meeting my own psychological desires, which violates its essential nature.

Proper and legitimate sex, then, is not just as simple as a sexual act between two consenting adults. It requires it to be practiced in a very specific psychosocial setting: it must be between a man and woman, married to one another, consensual, and unitive. All of that is discoverable by an analysis of the essence of sex itself. Such is the case with any moral issue. We analyze the nature of the issues involved and see how thins are intrinsically ordered and act appropriately in that light.

[Beanybag]

I appreciate your responses. You would say my version of ethics is incorrect since it allows for clearly unethical practices such as homosexuality and wicked fantasies and goes against the intrinsic order of things. I say yours is too restrictive since I don't personally agree, and think both of those behaviors are fine (and restriction of those behaviors when naturally inclined to do so can lead to depression). However, I understand your point of view and will definitely check out the book you recommended. Thanks for your time. :]

[Danieltwotwenty]

I actually thought that that was not proven at all. Please provide a source if you have seen otherwise.

http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1503314


http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/19016226


http://www.worldcat.org/title/teens-at- ... /233173077

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/18161877

http://cjb.sagepub.com/content/35/3/311.short

http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/sjp/67/1/41/

http://cmch.tv/research/fullRecord.asp?id=4776

These are some things I googled, there were many other but I didn't want to list them all here.

I would like to see the study you cited about porn decreases cases of rape.

Dan

[Beanybag]

The study I mentioned was only speculative - it only showed a correlation between internet usage and lowered rates of rape incidents. There could be many different reasons other than pornography for this decrease in rape, but it is a possibility.

As for those studies (the scientific ones), they all appeared to just identify a correlation between violence and violent video games. But they don't seem to identify any sort of causal relationship (aggressive kids could simply prefer violent games). I'm willing to withhold my judgment on violent video games causing violence until such time a causal relationship is shown. It would seem this area is very controversial, but certainly, the hypothesis that violence can be caused by violent video games is not disproven like I said - I retract that much. Interesting things to read nonetheless. :]

[jlay]

However, I've never been convinced that any type of fantasy, especially when it is in the realm of fiction, is bad.

Let's take sexual predators. How many sexual predators do you think started without first creating a fantasy world in which they acted out their behaviors?
Also, do you think Hitler would have committed his crimes had he not fantasized a world abscent of the Jew?

[Beanybag]

However, I've never been convinced that any type of fantasy, especially when it is in the realm of fiction, is bad.

Let's take sexual predators. How many sexual predators do you think started without first creating a fantasy world in which they acted out their behaviors?
Also, do you think Hitler would have committed his crimes had he not fantasized a world abscent of the Jew?

Why don't we try to leave Hitler out of this. Again, what is it to anyone if the fantasy is not in any way causal? See my previous post:

But the majority of non-offenders might also fantasize before their non-action. If it isn't causative of anything, what is it to anyone?
...
Well, the point I'm trying to make is: The majority of sex-offenders probably had breakfast the day they offended. Does that mean anything? It might be intuitive to think that fantasizing before the action has something to do with the action, but I just am unsure. It would seem that a whole lot of people fantasize about things and I am not one to sentence them to a crime they never committed - rather I'd commend them for not harming anyone to begin with. I am not saying you have to agree, just voicing my thoughts. Thanks for sharing. :]

[PaulSacramento]

Does one become a sexual predator because he sees his fantasies come true in pornography? or does he LOOK for the kind of porn that he wants to see that in?
What of all those sexual predators that existed long before print media even?
Sexual predators have been around since man looked at what was NOT his and wanted it and was string enough to take it.
I was brought up with violent cartoons, love kung fu flicks and samurai blood baths, have been doing MA since I was 9 ( I'm gonna be 43 this year), violence has been a part of my life since I was a kid ( worked as a doorman, served as a peackeeper) and I am not a violent person, dislike violence and do my best to avoid it.
Of course if it rears it's ugly head I am ready to "bite it off", but that is what i t is.
Neither seek nor shun the fight, as it were.
The point being is that the problems like violence, sexual perversions and such are NOT created by "outside influences" BUT they ( those influences) can make one thing they are "ok" or at least "tolerable" perhaps even "desirable".

[Danieltwotwenty]

The study I mentioned was only speculative - it only showed a correlation between internet usage and lowered rates of rape incidents. There could be many different reasons other than pornography for this decrease in rape, but it is a possibility.

Right, so no peer reviewed material, well that sums up that argument.

As for those studies (the scientific ones), they all appeared to just identify a correlation between violence and violent video games. But they don't seem to identify any sort of causal relationship (aggressive kids could simply prefer violent games). I'm willing to withhold my judgment on violent video games causing violence until such time a causal relationship is shown. It would seem this area is very controversial, but certainly, the hypothesis that violence can be caused by violent video games is not disproven like I said - I retract that much. Interesting things to read nonetheless. :]

There is actually no peer reviewed material I could find for a counter argument, and every thing I read on debates of this nature seemed to indicate that no evidence was linked with the negative argument and the positive argument is widely accepted as factual.
Sounds like a closed case to me.

Dan

[DivineRageFromSpace]

I said the moral order is played out in society, and that just in virtue of what morality is. That doesn't mean that society determines morality. It just means that where there is no society, there is no such thing as morality (sort of like if there is no universe, there is such thing as physics).

Much clearer! Thank you for bearing with me so far . . .

Again, you misunderstood me. Society can change its mind about what is moral. That doesn't mean that society decides what is moral or not. Suppose I am taking a math test. I mark a particular answer. Later, upon thinking about it, I change my mind and then change the answer. Does my new answer change whether or not the sum really is what it is? No. It only changes whether or not I am right about that sum.

In this example, there is a very clear, black-and-white answer: and you either marked the correct one or you marked one of the wrong ones. Every rational person who can figure maths agrees that the correct answer is indeed correct. The correct answer could be representative of intrinsic morals, as you intended it to be, and the rational mathematicians accepting the correct answer could be representative of the "normal" portion of society accepting those morals. Of course, since the example relies on the answer being a definite thing that society can clearly see for themselves, it shouldn't apply to something as undefined (and even subjective, in some cases) as morals. I mean to say that morals, at least in certain circumstances, are something of a Sorites paradox, as the dividing lines between what is moral and what is immoral are often too vague to draw.

The bottom line, again, is that your argument fails because you are appealing to nature in the sense of "mother nature," that which is observed by physical science. I, however, am appealing to nature in the sense of a thing's essence--what a thing really is in and of itself. When you hear people say, "That's just human nature," they're using the word more closely to the way I am.

And what are morals, in and of themselves? Moreover, how can we be certain that what we're doing follows these morals? "It's just human nature" seems very subjective to me, equivalent to saying, "I felt it was the right thing to do", and "It just came naturally to me". If it just comes naturally to a psychopath to kill a man, then it was in his nature to do so -- and therefore he could argue that it was just human nature, because he's human and it was in his nature. (Granted, such an argument on his part wouldn't hold up in any objective discussion.) What separates his jaded morals from the proper morals of "normal" society?

[DivineRageFromSpace]

I was brought up with violent cartoons, love kung fu flicks and samurai blood baths, have been doing MA since I was 9 ( I'm gonna be 43 this year), violence has been a part of my life since I was a kid ( worked as a doorman, served as a peackeeper) and I am not a violent person, dislike violence and do my best to avoid it.

I also grew up with violence and sex in the media without becoming a mass murderer or a rapist! What a coincidence!

. . . The point being is that the problems like violence, sexual perversions and such are NOT created by "outside influences" BUT they ( those influences) can make one thing they are "ok" or at least "tolerable" perhaps even "desirable".

Very true: Although violent fantasies can desensitize people to real violence, they don't necessarily cause it.